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XIV

DEVIATIONISM

If I climb up into heaven, thou art there;
If I go down to hell, thou art there also.
If I say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me,
Then shall my night be turned to day.

IN Stalinist jargon every word I have quoted here would be termed ideological distortion, deviationism, apoliticality, gross manifestation of bourgeois-nationalism calling for immediate correction by means of a radical ideological-creative reorientation. Babur would not have liked it, but that is how they talk; indeed, each phrase comes straight from the current press. We have seen how in the earlier days the Soviets resolved the contradiction between their national professions and their real objectives by evoking the rights of the proletariat as a higher force which must overcome the right of national self-determination. In effect, although they did not then so formulate it, their case at that time was that the loss of a nation's right to independence is no doubt an evil, but it is a lesser evil than the sacrifice of the rights of the workers. (Note that the fact that in Central Asia all the 'workers' were then Russian is immaterial to the doctrine as a first principle.) Since, as they say, continued independence would have involved the latter, the loss of independence, regrettable in theory, must follow. But in the first years, as the Kremlin saw it, it was expedient to accord lip-service to an abstract nationalism so far as to encourage a local literature and a press which should play up Central Asian resistance to the Tsarist conquest. At the time this could do no harm; it diverted national patriotisms to a past age, and it drew a possibly useful distinction between the Bolsheviks and the outmoded Russian Empire to which they had suc-

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ceeded. National tradition therefore was lauded, national epics were unearthed and reduced to writing, and there was a period of studious academic research into the national achievements of the various parts of Turkistan. These early years were indeed in many respects favourable to the work of profound Russian scholars such as Barthold and Samoylovich. The temporary relaxation also served to encourage the emergence of a native intelligentsia ambitious to combine pride in their national past with the outlook of a Communist on the contemporary world. It was a fool's paradise.

In those early years this encouragement of what may be called a cultural nationalism was expressed by the now outdated 'School of Pokrovsky'. Pokrovsky was a well-known Russian historian who lived from 1868 to 1932, so flourishing in both the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. Once esteemed by the Soviets as an evangelist, he is now discredited, and with him the edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*[1] which borrowed his learning and announced his gospel. His historical theory was the simple one of regarding the annexation of any non-Russian territory by Tsarist Russia as an absolute evil, resistance to which on the part of a national-liberation movement was a progressive and even a revolutionary act. Pokrovsky in fact was the mouthpiece of the apparent liberalism which prompted the Declaration of November 1917 on the right of all nations to independence, and incidentally was useful for export. It was not long before this school of thought was found too productive of national pride. After some preliminary outpost actions of a probing nature, the Pokrovsky theory met with definite official attack in a Decree dated 27th August 1937, issued by the jury of the Government Commission for the Best Textbook on the History of the USSR.[2] This Decree assailed Pokrovsky as the slave of a defective anti-Marxist convention, the author of a heresy which has become anathema. In the place of his theory it propounded a new first principle known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil, now an immaculate doctrine in the Soviet Creed.

[1] Bib. III, 10. See Vol. 45, Column 856.

[2] Bib. II, 11.

The population of the former[1] was traditionally nomadic, Turkish, and in religious matters fairly indifferent. Turkestan, on the other hand, being predominantly urban and agricultural, and inhabited by Iranians and considerably Arabicized and Iranicized Turks, was until the Soviet period one of the great centers of Islamic learning and practice. This difference between the religious background of the two regions must be kept in mind when studying contemporary Central Asian Muslims.

The most striking feature of the religious attitude of the Muslim refugees is their strong and articulate hostility toward all forms of established religion, including Islam. Time and again, the informants expressed the conviction that all religion is a form of superstition incapable of standing the test of "science," of serving society as a means of attaining social progress. The typical opinion ran as follows: "Yes, I believe in a Supreme Being, but it doesn't matter whether He is called Allah, God, Christ, or anything else. Nor does He care whether I pray or not. Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people in facing life." The general assumptions behind such reasoning are fairly obvious: the belief in a conflict between faith and reason, religion and science; a pragmatic, utilitarian scale of values; scepticism of certain aspects of religion, leading to a wholesale rejection of all religion.

In the long run, this attitude may well determine the whole future of Islam in Central Asia. The intelligentsia displays the same cult of reason, and of its concomitant, secular society, in an extreme, uncomprising way, as do the educated groups of other Asian societies. Here, as there, progress, the ultimate good, is conceived as incompatible with religion. Against such hostility to established religion the revival of Islam in its pre-1917 form, even under conditions of complete freedom, does not seem likely.

This conclusion is strengthened by the picture given of the religious practices of Central Asian Muslims. Islam in the Soviet Union has to operate under extremely difficult conditions, due in part to the specific repressive measures undertaken by the regime against religion, and in part to the general conditions of Soviet life. In the first category are the physical destruction of the Islamic leadership undertaken between 1927 and 1932 through the arrest and deportation of virtually all persons enjoying some religious status in the Muslim community, from the top hierarchy to the lowest village mullah; the closing of nearly all the village mosques and most of the city mosques; the threat of dismissal hanging constantly over every Soviet citizen in any position of responsibility if known to engage in religious practices; and the nearly complete suppression of all religious literature through the change of the native alphabets (from Arabic to

[1] [the northern half of Soviet Central Asia or Kazakhstan -- Analyst]

585 Occasionally, refugees indicate, after
177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
518 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[8]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
795 1927–32 period seems entirely out of the question. Islam still survives as
177 a powerful social bond because it serves to differentiate the native from

[8] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

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177 dating, employment of men and women in offices and stores — all these
562 factors tend to break down the wall between the sexes. The Muslim youth today is not only increasingly able to plan its future without regard to the wishes of parents, but also has many opportunities to mingle freely with members of the opposite sex. All this helps undermine the traditional-habits
517 in marriage selection. Among the urban Muslim intelligentsia it appears
583 now to be the rule for the young couples to decide upon marriage first and to ask parents for permission afterwards, as is done in Western societies. In the villages, where the hold of tradition is stronger and the family more closely knit, the parents still do play an important, and perhaps even decisive, role in the arrangement of marriages; but here, too, the tendency seems to run against tradition.

583 An influential factor in the marriage arrangement among Central Asian
177 Muslims was the *kalym*, or bride price. The *kalym* was paid to the parents of the bride by the parents of the bridegroom prior to the wedding. In the steppe regions, it consisted usually of livestock, averaging in pre-Revolutionary days from 50 to 100 horses and an equal or larger number of sheep — a sizeable fortune by local standards. In Turkestan, the *kalym* consisted of gifts of money, jewels, or other valuables. The payment of the *kalym* is one of the few traditions of a nonreligious nature outlawed by the Soviet regime, ostensibly as "degrading" to women, but its illegality explains only in part its actual decline, which is probably due more to the impoverishment of the native population over the past 25 years. What Kazakh disposes of 50 horses or sheep? Poverty seems to have reduced the tradition of the *kalym* to a purely symbolic significance. It apparently continues to survive in one form or another throughout Central Asia, but it no longer performs any important economic function.

836 One of the more startling results of information gathered from refugees
177 is the impression of strict sexual morality prevailing among Soviet Muslims. Despite the freer mingling of sexes, there is little opportunity for sexual promiscuity because of the close watch exercised over the girls by their families and the great value attached by the natives to virginity. Most of the refugees agreed that an unmarried Muslim girl who has lost her virginity — no matter under what circumstances — is considered to be on the same level as a common prostitute. Her chances of marriage are almost nonexistent, because it is generally accepted that a marriage contract is void if the bride is found on the wedding night not to be a virgin. On the whole, sexual licentiousness seems rare: it is prevented by tradition and by the control exercised by the family, to whom a deflowered daughter not only brings public disgrace but also represents a lasting financial liability.[4]

[4] Newspapers and periodicals from Central Asia indicate that, despite Soviet efforts aimed at changing native attitudes toward women, tradition persists. It seems apparently to be quite common practice for natives to withdraw daughters from school when the girls attain the

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as an important second (but "foreign") language; passing a Russian language examination seems to be a graduation prerequisite for all high-school students, regardless of nationality. Every graduate of a Soviet high school is thus expected to possess a knowledge of Russian. Whether or not this knowledge actually exists probably depends more on what the student does after graduation than upon the intensity or quality of his training. For the average Muslim girl who marries a Muslim and then raises a family, her high-school Russian language instruction is wasted, for at home she speaks her native tongue and soon forgets all she has learned; the same is probably true of the Muslim youth who returns to the village after his studies. For the more enterprising wage earner, however, the Russian training is of greater and more lasting importance: it represents the key to all further academic or professional advancement, as well as to membership in the vast party and state apparatus, which comprise and circumscribe a "career" in Soviet society.[7]

At one time the Communists made serious attempts in the direction of founding university-level training in the native languages, but these endeavors were not very successful, in part because of the shortage of qualified native teaching personnel and in part as a result of the general trend in the direction of Russification. Today most of the university-level instruction, except that which by its very content requires the use of local languages (Central Asian archeology, anthropology, philology, folklore, etc.), appears to be conducted in Russian.

A young Muslim, in order to succeed in life, must learn Russian and learn it well. Among the Muslim intelligentsia, therefore, a knowledge of Russian is widespread. But — and this is essential for the present inquiry — by acquiring a knowledge of Russian the local Muslims do not, as is apparently anticipated by the regime, lose command of their own language; instead, they become bilingual. Russian is the language of business, and the means through which it is possible to establish some contact with the culture of the outside world; it is not the language of daily life, in use at home, in the family, and among friends. The refugee informants were unanimous in asserting that neither they nor their friends, even those active in the Party, ever spoke Russian elsewhere than at work. They were equally firm in maintaining that they knew no Muslims who had lost command of their native speech. This assertion is reinforced by the observation that the Muslim refugees in Germany do not communicate

[7] According to the *Central Asian Review*, admission to the State University of Turkmenia and the Turkmen Academy of Sciences is "dependent upon students passing an examination in Russian and Russian literature." On the other hand, "Russian students at the Academy of Sciences are only required to have a knowledge of the Turkmen language if they intend to make a special study of Turkmen language and literature." There is no reason to suppose that the pattern is different in the other republics of Central Asia. *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 65-66.

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517 with each other in Russian, even on occasions when, because of diverse ethnic origins, communication in Turki presents considerable difficulties.

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517 It is as yet too early to estimate the effects of Soviet linguistic policy aimed at Russification through methods which are both negative (division of Muslim groups) and positive (the imposition of Russian through compulsion, linguistic infiltration, and career inducements). On the eve of World War II the Muslim rural masses seemed to have been quite unaffected by Soviet linguistic measures, and so were the poorer and less educated elements in the cities. These groups continued, as before, to communicate exclusively in their native dialects, being ignorant of Russian. Soviet policies did cause the numerous and growing Muslim intelligentsia to acquire a working knowledge of Russian; but instead of becoming Russified these groups became bilingual, using Russian for the purposes of work, and Turki or Persian, as the case may be, for all other purposes. Of linguistic assimilation there does not seem the slightest evidence; on the contrary, all signs point to a remarkable ability of the local languages to survive in the face of strong external pressures.

5/7 GGB The Russian Muslims already possessed such a class[1] prior to 1917, consisting largely of professional people, especially lawyers, teachers, journalists, and engineers from the Kazan and Baku areas. This intelligentsia played a leading role in the Muslim national movements during the Revolution and the period immediately following it; many of its members cooperated with the Soviet regime in the 1920's, during the era of Communist "softness" toward Muslim nationalism; others, especially those who had been connected with the White Guard movement during the Civil War, went into hiding or disassociated themselves from all further political activity.

5/7 GGB Most of the older Muslim intelligentsia of the Soviet Union — pro-Communist and anti-Communist alike — was physically destroyed in the course of the purges, arrests, deportations, and executions of the 1930's. On the eve of World War II Soviet Muslims found themselves without national leadership, since the only other classes capable of providing it — the landowners, merchants, and the clergy — had also been liquidated in the course of the simultaneous drives for collectivization and against the Islamic religion in the late 1920's and early 1930's.

It is a perennial dilemma of the Soviet system that its dynamic totalitarianism requires an unusually large body of trained officials, and yet it cannot permit these officials the freedom of thought and action which they demand in consequence of their training. The principal solution which Communism has so far been able to devise for this problem consists of periodic purges, causing the destruction of the established bureaucracy and its replacement with ever new personnel — a procedure very costly in terms of manpower, but roughly serving the purpose for which it is devised. However, the system of purges, mass as well as local, requires constant repetition, for purge as it may, the Soviet regime cannot alter the fact that the intelligentsia, whose growth it is actively promoting, chafes under the yoke of totalitarianism and constitutes one of the major sources of tension within the established order.

5/7 It is this feature of its system which compelled the Soviet regime to replace the old intelligentsia of Central Asian Muslims destroyed by it with a new one. The new intelligentsia is largely Soviet-educated, and comprises people most of whom are today under 40 years of age. This new intelligentsia is, by comparison with the old, pre-Revolutionary one, very numerous. According to Soviet statistics for 1939, in the 5 republics of Central Asia there were 66,000 active students in technical and other specialized schools above the high-school level, and 35,000 active students in universities and other institutions of higher learning. Central Asia also had 758,000 persons with a completed high-school education and 57,000 with a completed higher education. Even allowing that a sizable proportion of these persons consists of Russians and other Europeans, the number of Muslims among them must be very considerable. Measured by Western European

[1] [i.e., an intelligentsia -- Analyst]

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standards, the training of these "intellectuals," even graduates of universities, is quite poor. What matters, however, is not their level of knowledge, but their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population and the attitudes and aspirations resulting from their training.

Evidence indicates that the graduates of schools consider themselves superior to manual labor, and expect to be rewarded for their schooling with administrative or other office work. The Muslim intellectual seems to feel that education entitles one not so much to greater rewards as to a reduction of the working load. It is a professional intelligentsia which aspires to national leadership and is strongly interested in political action.

The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses many of the characteristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, but in addition it also displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia.

The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in Central Asia a peculiar position: by origin, language, culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training, work, and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population. Such a class had existed, of course, in Central Asia prior to the Revolution, and it arises in most colonial systems, but it has never before been so numerous and ubiquitous as it is in Soviet Central Asia. What are its ideas, attitudes, and prospects? Upon the answer to this question depends to a large extent whether the potentialities of a Muslim revival in Central Asia can ever be realized.

Evidence secured from interviews indicates that Muslim intellectuals in Central Asia consider themselves full-fledged Europeans. Startling as this may be to a Westerner, it must be remembered that to many an Asian "Europe" means not so much a geographic concept as a way of life, characterized by technology and secularism, which had been brought to Asia by Europeans. None of the Central Asian refugees interviewed considered himself to be an Asian, and several took offence at the very suggestion that this may be the case. Most of the refugees have a vivid contempt for the non-Soviet East. For instance, several of the refugees who had served in the Soviet army in Iran during World War II spoke with utter contempt of the natives of that country as "Asiatics." Even Turkey, where several of the DP's found refuge after the war, appeared to them backward and "Oriental." Many Muslim DP's left Turkey for Germany or the United States after having been received there with open arms, because, as they put it, they found life there strange and difficult.

Despite its superficial Westernization and Sovietization, this new intelligentsia has not severed the ties binding it to the remainder of Muslim society in Central Asia. It is connected with the population culturally: the in-

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517 177 186 tellectuals communicate with each other in the local Turki dialects, not in Russian; they retain the customs, traditions, and other cultural traits previously discussed: they marry Muslims. They also retain a sense of loyalty to their people, a loyalty which is sufficiently strong to be seemingly unaffected by the close ties between the intellectuals and the regime. It is noteworthy that the majority of the refugees, though outspokenly anti-Communist in their sentiments, agreed that there is little friction between Muslim Communists and the rest of the Muslim population. The population does not transfer its dislike of the regime to its individual Muslim representatives, nor does it seem to regard Muslim Communists as apostates. On the contrary, Muslim Party members are regarded rather as friends and protectors, capable of shielding the inhabitants from the full brunt of Soviet policies. Many refugees recalled instances of receiving special consideration from Muslim Communists. The population is inclined to regard Muslims connected with the Communist machine as unwitting instruments of an evil system and to judge them entirely on their individual merits. Conversely, interrogation of Muslim refugees who had at one time belonged to the Communist Party indicates that in their minds they have not changed their national status by virtue of their Party allegiance. The notion of an all-embracing "Soviet" patriotism, fostered by the regime in its borderlands, apparently has had little if any success among the intellectuals.

This combination of Westernism and ethnic loyalty leads to the development of a sense of national consciousness on the part of the intelligentsia. However, because of Soviet cultural measures in the borderlands, this feeling appears to be as yet rather formless, inchoate, and devoid of a well formulated ideology.

517 175 177 For one thing, the Muslim intelligentsia is woefully ignorant of the history of Turkestan. This is hardly surprising, since the first histories of that area were published only after World War II (if one excepts the very scholarly and inaccessible monographs of Bartold and a few other scholars). The Soviet government deliberately minimizes the history of the Central Asian Turks and exaggerates the role of the Russian conqueror in order to undermine local nationalism and facilitate Russification. But the effect of these measures appears to be quite the opposite of what the Communists intend. Objectively speaking, the history of Turkestan is largely the story of the gradual conquest and destruction of a great Iranian civilization by barbarian Turkic nomads, resulting in perpetual internecine wars, isolation from the rest of the world, and cultural petrification of that area. In other words, the history of the Central Asian Turks is by no means a glorious one, either politically or culturally. By suppressing the study of native history, the regime actually helps stimulate the imagination of the native population. Ignorant of the facts, the natives glorify their past and create a mental picture of greatness which is quite unwarranted

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by the historical record. Several of the more educated refugees presented a completely distorted conception of Central Asian history; it was so idealized as to be a model for the stimulation of nationalist emotions.

The refugees also know very little about Central Asian history of recent times. The jadidist movement, the All-Russian Muslim movement, the events of the Revolution and civil war, the Kokand and Alash-Orda governments, are meaningless names to most of them. Most of the younger refugees knew of these events from the Soviet trials of the 1930's; none of them knew what these parties really stood for. *Basmachestvo* [14] was somewhat better known, because of its resurgence during the period of collectivization. Almost all of the refugees from Central Asia had had some personal experiences with the Basmachis, and could discuss the activities of these rebels in their region, though also tending to exaggerate their feats.

CONCLUSIONS

Speaking broadly, Soviet Central Asia may be said to have undergone in the course of the past fifty years two parallel developments: the native population has been transformed from a loose agglomeration of diverse tribes and ill-defined ethnic groups into several distinct nationalities, and the Russians residing in Central Asia have grown from an insignificant minority to an important segment of the total population. Both these developments are intimately connected; both may be expected to continue in the foreseeable future.

The first of these two processes has been by and large encouraged by the Soviet authorities because of their fear of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. Faced with the choice of a movement aspiring to integrate all the Central Asian natives into a single nationality bound by the ties of a common religion or racial descent, and the formation of several separate nationalities, they selected the latter alternative as less dangerous to their political hold on the area. This course, however, had its price, for it compelled the Communists to encourage the growth of national consciousness among the major native ethnic groups.

But it would be a mistake to seek in Soviet strategy the *cause* of this process of nationality formation. The cause lies far deeper. The growth of nationalism in Central Asia, as in other parts of the world recently affected by European ideas, institutions, and technology, must above all be ascribed to the fact that the encounter of Westernism and tradition rarely results in a clear-cut victory for either force, but rather leads to a synthesis of both. *Nationalism represents such a synthesis of imported Western and traditional native values.* It owes its success to the fact that it permits the adoption of all the essential features of European civilization

[14] *Basmachestvo* was a native resistance movement directed against the Soviet regime; it was particularly active in the period 1918–1922. See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 178–80, 255–60.

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to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

* At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.[4]

of the teaching staffs, including headmasters, have no proper training in methods of tuition and quite frequently not even a secondary school training. Finally, higher demands are made upon a young Uzbek, Kirghiz or Kazakh than upon a young Russian who wishes to engage in a scientific or technical career. The former must have a complete command of both his own and the Russian language and culture when trying for a higher post, whereas for the Russian the knowledge of his mother tongue is sufficient. A knowledge, however slight, of another language is a valuable asset, but not a condition, for his successful career. Many gifted Central Asiatics do not qualify for higher technical education because of their insufficient knowledge of Russian. Without a perfect knowledge of Russian, the young Central Asiatic is debarred from qualifying for attendance not only at higher educational institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, but even at some of the better medical and technical high schools in his own republic where Russian still remains the language of teaching, despite all the cultural progress made by the Central Asiatic peoples under the Soviet régime. The recognition of the Russians as the 'elder brother' also implies the recognition of certain privileges for them. Thus the 'Russian brother' occupies many important key positions in all Central Asiatic Republics, he dominates the local ministries for internal affairs and state security, he provides the personnel for the office of the local public prosecutor, he is in charge of state banking and economic planning. Any criticism of this Russian colonization is out of the question since it would contradict the basic rules of 'family affection'.

The Russians living in the various Central Asiatic Republics are even entitled to join hands for common cultural tasks while the Central Asiatic peoples, as we have seen, are kept apart as much as possible. Thus in May 1948, a conference of Russian writers of Central Asia met in Tashkent. The conference dealt amongst other things with the help which Russian authors were to give to Russian theatres throughout Central Asia.[10]

Having stressed in principle the paramount importance of the Russian factor in Soviet Central Asia, we can now discuss the problems of the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics in detail. We start with Kazakhstan, which, from a purely geographical point of view, is only partly situated in Central Asia, but which politically and ethnographically is inseparably linked with the other four Central Asiatic Republics.

I. KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan covers a territory of over 1,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Volga delta to the Chinese border. It is the mineral storehouse of the Soviet Union. It ranks first in the world for its